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Case No. 20110842-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 




Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals from its opinion in State v. Simons, 2011 UT App 251, 262 P.3d 53 
(Addendum A). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction from its grant of 
certiorari under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
After stopping the car in which Petitioner was a passenger, the officer 
saw drug paraphernalia in the driver's door. Then, while his partner 
watched the driver, the officer approached Petitioner, told him what he had 
found, and asked Petitioner if he had anything on his person he needed to 
know about. Petitioner confessed that he had a pipe in his underwear. 
Did the officer's brief inquiry of Petitioner infringe upon his 
Fourth Amendment rights? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, * 
Tf 9, 22 P.3d 1242. "The correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision turns 
on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under ^ 
the appropriate standard of review." Id. A trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The court's 
4 
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, 
f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-
deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal standard 
to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,. f 11,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of Facts. 
While patrolling SR-77 near Springville, Deputy John Luke and a 
deputy he was training ("officer-in-training'') saw a car traveling 10 miles 
per hour above the posted speed limit. R92:4-5,17-18 (R49). When a 
computer check also revealed that the car was uninsured, the deputies 
made a traffic stop. R92:5,17-19 (R48). While Deputy Luke watched from 
the passenger side of the vehicle, the officer-in-training spoke with the 
driver. R92:5,19-20,27-28 (R49-48). Petitioner was sitting in the front 
passenger seat, but Deputy Luke did not speak with him at that time. 
R92:5,20,27-28. 
After the officer-in-training finished speaking with the driver, the two 
deputies met at the front of their patrol car. R92:21 (R48). Deputy Luke 
then approached the driver and collected his driver's license and the vehicle 
registration. R92:5,21-22,28 (R48). The driver was unable to produce proof 
of insurance for the car, which had been borrowed. R92:5,22 (R48). While 
speaking with the driver, Deputy Luke smelled no alcohol, but "observed 
[other] signs of possible impairment," including watery, bloodshot eyes and 
"very rapid speech and movement." R92:6,20-23 (R48). The driver's 
"unusual" and "agitated" behavior continued while Deputy Luke returned 
to his patrol car and conducted a computer check. R92:6,23 (R48). 
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When Deputy Luke reapproached the car after completing the 
computer check, the driver thrust his face toward the window and blurted ^ 
out, "I'm not drunk, I haven't been drinking, look at my eyes/7 R92:6,22-23 
(R48). At that point, Deputy Luke asked the driver to exit the car to perform j 
field sobriety tests. R92:6,23 (R.48). As the driver got out, Deputy Luke saw 
in plain view chewed baggies in the door's side compartment. R92:7-8,23-
24,28 (R48). Recognizing the baggies as drug paraphernalia, Deputy Luke 
retrieved them and verified that they contained "a white powder of a small 
crystal residue" that was consistent with methamphetamine. R92:8,24-25,27 
(R48). Deputy Luke then asked the officer-in-training to stay with the 
driver while he spoke with Petitioner. R92: 8,25 (R48-47). i 
Deputy Luke told Petitioner that he "had found paraphernalia in the 
car and asked him if he had anything on his person [he] need[ed] to know { 
about." R92:9,25 (R47). Petitioner immediately confessed that he had a pipe 
in his underwear. R92:9 (R47). Deputy Luke asked Petitioner to shake the 
pipe from his pants and when he did so, a glass methamphetamine pipe fell 
to the ground. R92:9 (R47). The deputies then arrested the driver and 
found methamphetamine on his person in a search incident to arrest. R92:9-
11,26. Thereafter, Petitioner volunteered that he had "some" in his pocket 
and he surrendered a baggie of methamphetamine. R92:10-12,26 (R47). 
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B. Summary of Proceedings. 
Petitioner was charged with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. R.6-5. He moved to suppress the 
evidence seized during the stop, arguing that the question posed to him by 
Deputy Luke was beyond the stop's permissible scope. R.35-24. The district 
court denied the motion, ruling that the question was justified because the 
driver's possible impairment and the drug paraphernalia evidence created 
"a reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car." R.49-
46 (Addendum B). Petitioner thereafter pled guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion 
to suppress. R.72-71,69-58. Petitioner was sentenced to a suspended prison 
term of up to five years and placed on supervised probation for 36 months. 
R.90-88. 
Petitioner timely appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See 
Simons, 2011 UT App 251. The court did not address the district court's 
ruling that reasonable suspicion justified the deputy's inquiry to Petitioner. 
Citing Arizona v. jofatson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), the Court of Appeals instead 
held that the deputy's inquiry "did not measurably extend the length of the 
traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop unreasonable." 
Simons, 2011 UT App 251, f l l . 
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i 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence i 
seized from his person during the traffic stop. It correctly ruled that the 
facts known to the officer supported "a reasonable suspicion and concern 
about both occupants of the car/' justifying the deputy's brief inquiry of 
Petitioner. R47. The Court of Appeals did not address the trial court's 
i 
ruling, but affirmed on alternative grounds. It held that "the question did 
not measurably extend the length of the traffic stop or render the overall 
duration of the stop unreasonable." Simons, 2011 UT App 251, Tfll. This 
Court may affirm on either ground. 
The police may extend a detention for additional questioning if the i 
facts and circumstances create reasonable suspicion of further criminal 
activity. The trial court correctly concluded that the deputy's question was -
supported by new reasonable suspicion. Chewed baggies of meth were 
discovered in the side compartment of the driver's door and the driver 
< 
appeared to be impaired on something other than alcohol. Where Petitioner 
was traveling with the driver, Supreme Court precedent makes clear tnat it 
< 
is reasonable for an officer to infer that both driver and passenger are 
engaged in a common enterprise —in this case, the possession or use of 
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drugs. This easily satisfies the reasonable suspicion standard for additional 
investigative questioning. 
The Supreme Court has further held that a passenger's belongings in 
a car may be searched under similar circumstances. The Court has also held 
that where drugs are found in the backseat of a car and the vehicle's 
occupants deny ownership, probable cause exists to justify the arrest of all 
occupants, including the front seat passenger. Where the discovery of 
contraband in a car justifies an officer's search of a passenger's belongings, 
and even the arrest of the passenger, the officer may surely question the 
passenger about contraband. 
In any event, the deputy's question to Petitioner did not convert the 
otherwise lawful encounter into an unlawful seizure, nor did it prolong the 
detention beyond the time reasonably required to fulfill the deputy's 
legitimate mission. The single question posed occurred in the midst of the 
lawful stop and could not have lasted more than a second or two. 
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the question "measurably extended" the 
duration of the stop. Nor is this case like State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 229 P.3d 
650, where the purpose of the stop had already been completed. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE OFFICER'S SINGLE QUESTION TO PETITIONER DID < 
NOT EXCEED THE STOP'S PERMISSIBLE SCOPE 
After Deputy Luke saw drug paraphernalia in the driver's door, he 
briefly turned his attention to Petitioner—the front seat passenger —told ' 
him what he had found, and asked if he had anything on him he needed to 
know about. R92:9,25. This question led to the seizure of drugs and ^ 
paraphernalia. See R92:9-12,26. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion to 
suppress the evidence and the court of appeals affirmed, but on alternative 
i 
grounds. This Court may affirm on the ground upon which the trial court 
relied: The paraphernalia in plain view created "a reasonable suspicion and 
concern about both occupants of the car/7 justifying the brief inquiry of 
Petitioner. R47. Or, the Court may affirm on the ground upon which the 
court of appeals relied: "[T]he question did not [in any event] measurably 
extend the length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the 
stop unreasonable/' Simons, 2011 UT App 251, Tfll. < 
* * * . 
A traffic stop is a seizure of "everyone in the vehicle'''' and thus, ail 
vehicle occupants are entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-58 (2007). Like any other seizure, a 
traffic stop must meet two basic Fourth Amendment requirements. The 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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stop must (1) be "lawful at its inception," and (2) be "executed in a 
reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). The 
lawfulness of the stop in this case is undisputed. The observed speeding 
violation gave the deputies, at least, reasonable suspicion to warrant a stop. 
See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, the only 
issue on certiorari is whether the stop was "executed in a reasonable 
manner." Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. It was. 
A traffic stop is reasonable in its execution so long as the officer 
"diligently pursue[s]" a course of action that is likely to fulfill the purpose 
of the stop. See United States v. Slwiye, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). The police 
must end the stop and release the vehicle's occupants "when [they] have no 
further need to control the scene." Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 
(2009). This normally occurs once the initial purpose for the stop is 
concluded. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \31, 63 P.3d 650. But officers are 
also allowed "'to graduate their responses to the demands of [the] 
particular situation." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (citation omitted). Accordingly, 
"[i]f, during the scope of [a lawful] traffic stop, the officer forms new 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may also 
expediently investigate his new suspicion." State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, % 13, 
229 P.3d 650. The deputies in this case met this standard. 
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A. The brief inquiry of Petitioner was justified by reasonable 
suspicion of further criminal activity. 
The traffic stop of Petitioner quickly, and properly, evolved into a 
drug investigation, supported by not just reasonable suspicion, but probable 
cause. After observing "signs of possible impairment" in the driver, but no 
alcohol odor, Deputy Luke asked the driver to step out of his vehicle. See 
R92:6,20-23. When the driver did so, the deputy saw "inside the door side 
compartment in plain view . . . several baggies that had been chewed on." 
R92:6-7. He immediately recognized the baggies as drug paraphernalia and 
retrieved them from the door. See R92:8. This plain view discovery was 
sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that other contraband or 
evidence might be in the car. See United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 690 
(10th Cir. 2002) (holding that "if an officer has lawfully observed an object 
of incriminating character in plain view in a vehicle, that observation, either 
alone or in combination with additional facts, has been held sufficient to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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allow the officer to conduct a probable cause search of the vehicle").! 
Petitioner conceded as much on direct appeal. See Aplt. Brf. at 9. 
But the facts, circumstances, and reasonable inferences in this case 
established more. They supported, at the very least, a reasonable suspicion 
that Petitioner also possessed contraband or was otherwise involved in 
drug activity together with the driver. As explained by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the intrusion occasioned by a detention for investigative questioning 
is "modest," United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-80 (1975), and 
"'surely less intrusive'" than a search. See Muehler v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93, 98 
(2005) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981)). For this 
reason, an investigatory detention is permissible if the officer's suspicion "is 
supported by specific and articulable facts as well as any rational inferences 
drawn from those facts/7 State v. Alvarez, 2006 UT 61, Tfl4, 147 P.3d 425 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). This standard is "less 
1
 cPP P n, ih.ii}-pr! S+n+PQ "7 A / r 7 , r ^ £on T: IA cue Q O ^ /Q4-U r ^ o m n \ 
(holding that discovery of crack pipes in a vehicle's console "would have 
provided probable cause to search anywhere in the car, including in the 
backpack, for further evidence of drug activity"); United. States v. Fladten, 230 
F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that discovery of an item 
"commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine" in plain view in 
automobile provided probable cause to believe that "further contraband or 
evidence may have been in the other parts of the automobile"). 
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demanding" than probable cause, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 
(2000), and was easily met here. 
The facts and circumstances confronting Deputy Luke were these: 
Petitioner was traveling in a car with "chewed" paraphernalia in plain view, 
and with a driver who appeared to be impaired by something other than 
alcohol. See R92:6-8,20-27,. Given these facts, Petitioner's presence in the car 
and association with the driver made it "reasonable for [Deputy Luke] to 
infer a common enterprise among the [two] men." See Maiyland v. Pringle, 
540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003). They "indicated the likelihood of [drug possession 
or use], an enterprise to which a [user] would be unlikely to admit an 
innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence against him." Id. 
Petitioner challenged this argument below, contending that his "mere 
presence" in the car did not support a reasonable suspicion that he was 
involved in drug activity. See Aplt. Brf. at 12-16. But an examination of four 
Supreme Court cases defeats that claim: United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 
(1948), Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S 85 (1979), Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 
(1999), and Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003). 
United States v. Di Re 
In Di Re, the Supreme Court addressed whether the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement includes the search of all occupants 
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"when the contraband sought is of a character that might be concealed on 
the person/' 332 U.S. at 584. In that case, Buffalo police officers stopped a 
car based on an informant's tip that the driver was selling counterfeit 
gasoline ration coupons at the identified location. Id. at 583. Both the driver 
and his front seat passenger, Di Re, were taken into custody and searched. 
Id. The search of Di Re uncovered two counterfeit coupons. Id. The 
Supreme Court recognized that vehicle occupants "could be used to conceal 
[such] contraband on [their] person," but declined to extend the automobile 
exception to the "search of guests in a car." Id. at 587. 
Ybana v. Illinois 
Some 30 years later, the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue, but 
in the context of a warrant search of a public tavern. In Ybarra, police 
officers secured a warrant to search a tavern and one of its bartenders for 
drugs based on information from an informant that the bartender was 
selling heroin, which he kept in packets on his person and under the bar. 
444 U.S. at 340-41. When officers executed the search warrant, they 
conducted patdown searches of the various customers present at the bar, 
one of whom was Ybarra. Id. at 341. The search of Ybarra uncovered 
several packets of heroin. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the 
patdown search of Ybarra was not justified. Id. at 90-91. The Court held 
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that "a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of 
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to 
search that person/' Id. at 91. 
Wyoming v.Houghton 
In Houghton, decided two decades later, the Supreme Court addressed 
a somewhat different question—whether the automobile exception 
embraces the "search [of] a passenger's personal belongings inside an 
automobile." 526 U.S. at 297 (emphasis added). After making a traffic stop, 
the officer in Houghton observed a syringe in the front pocket of the driver, 
who then admitted using it to take drugs. Id. at 298. Officers ordered the 
driver and his two female passengers — one of whom was Houghton—out of 
the car. Id. Even though the only evidence of criminal wrongdoing was 
found on the male driver's person, officers searched Houghton's purse in 
the backseat and found a syringe containing methamphetamine. Id. 
Relying on Di Re and Ybarra, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the 
automobile exception did not extend to the passenger's belongings. Id. at 
299,303. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 299-307. 
In reversing, Houghton distinguished Di Re and Ybarra. The Court 
observed that "a car passenger —unlike the unwitting tavern patron in 
Ybarra — will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and 
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have the same interest in concealing the fruits of the evidence of their 
wrongdoing/' Id. at 304-05. It also recognized that a driver "might be able 
to hide contraband in a passenger's belongings/7 Id. at 305. The Court thus 
held that "'[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped 
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that 
may conceal the object of the search/'7' including a passenger's belongings. 
Id. at 301-02 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982)) 
(emphasis supplied in Houghton). 
Although contraband may be concealed as readily on a passenger's 
person as among a passenger's belongings, Houghton did not overrule Di Re. 
The Court noted that Di Re " turned on the' unique, significantly heightened 
protection afforded against searches of one's person." Id. at 303. The Court 
reasoned that the search of a passenger's person is not justified under the 
circumstances because "the degree of intrusiveness upon personal privacy 
and indeed even personal dignity . . . differ substantially from [a] package 
search." Id. at 303. The Court concluded that the search of a passenger's 
belongings is justified because the "traumatic consequences [of a patdown 
search] are not to be expected when the police examine an item of personal 
property found in a car." Id. 
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Maryland v.Pringle 
Finally, in Maryland v. Pringle, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
discovery of contraband in an automobile may support a probable cause 
finding to arrest all occupants in the vehicle. In that case, a police officer 
stopped a car occupied by three men—a driver, a front seat passenger 
(Pringle), and a back seat passenger. Id. at 367-68. During the course of the 
stop, the officer discovered more than $700 in rolled-up cash in the glove 
box and five plastic baggies of cocaine behind the backseat armrest. Id. at 
368. When no one would admit ownership, the officer arrested all three. Id. 
at 368-69. Relying on Houghton, the Supreme Court held that because the 
men "were in a relatively small automobile, not a public tavern/' the officer 
reasonably "infer[red] a common enterprise among the three men." Id. at 
373. The Court thus concluded that the front seat passenger's arrest was 
justified because "the officer had probable cause to believe that [he] had 
committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance." Id, at 37A. 
* * * 
The issue in this case involves the brief questioning of a passenger 
(Petitioner), rather than the search of a passenger's belongings or person, or 
the arrest of a passenger. But Pringle and Houghton are instructive. Like the 
front seat passenger in Pringle, Petitioner and his companion "were in a 
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relatively small automobile, not a public tavern/7 540 U.S. at 373. And, as 
recognized in Houghton, it is reasonable in such cases to believe that the 
passenger is "engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and [that 
both] have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their 
wrongdoing." 526 U.S. at 304-05. Where an officer's discovery of 
contraband in the backseat of a car satisfies the probable cause burden for 
arresting a front seat passenger, Deputy Luke's discovery of chewed 
paraphernalia in the driver's door certainly satisfies the "less demanding" 
reasonable suspicion burden, Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, that is required for 
making the much "less intrusive" investigative query, see Mena, 544 U.S.. at 
9.8 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Under Houghton, Deputy Luke would have been justified in searching 
any belongings that Petitioner may have had in the car. And under Pringle's 
rationale, he was likewise justified in at least asking Petitioner whether he 
had anything he needed to know about. Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
Pringle implicitly recognized that when confronted with the discovery of 
drugs in a car, officers may at least query passengers about the drugs. For 
in Pringle, the officer "questioned all three men" about the drugs. Pringle, 
540 U.S. at 368-69. And all three were justifiably arrested, in part because 
they answered the officer's question and denied ownership. See id. at 372-73. 
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B, In any event, the deputy's question to Petitioner did not 
unreasonably delay the investigation. 
Even if Deputy Luke's question to Petitioner was unmoored from the 
legitimate, though evolving, purpose of the stop, it did not render his 
detention unlawful. 
As noted, for a traffic stop to be reasonable in its execution, officers 
must act "diligently" to fulfill the purpose of the stop and may not 
"unnecessarily prolong [the] detention." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86. "That 
being said, officers are not required to use the least restrictive means 
available in pursuing their investigation; the question is merely 'whether 
the police acted unreasonably in failing to . . . pursue' alternatives." State v. 
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 28, 164 P.3d 397 (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687). 
After all, "the Fourth Amendment's ultimate touchstone is 
'reasonableness.'" Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398, 404 (2006). 
Thus, when evaluating whether a stop was conducted in an improper 
manner, "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over 
rigid criteria." Sliarpe, 470 U.S. at 685. 
After making a lawful traffic stop, an officer may, of course, ask the 
driver and passengers "to explain [the] suspicious circumstances" that gave 
rise to the stop. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882. Additionally, "an officer 
'may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
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check [to verify that information], and issue a citation" or warning. State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31, 63 P.3d 650. This activity is part and parcel of the 
typical traffic stop. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding 
that "when either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure 
for violation of the law," an officer may "check [the motorist's] "driver's 
license and the registration of the automobile").2 
An officer may also run a warrants or background check on the 
driver, "so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention 
beyond that reasonably necessary" to fulfill the stop's initial objectives. See 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. Although not necessarily related to the purpose of 
the stop per se, such checks are permitted "in recognition of the safety risks 
confronting a police officer who makes a traffic stop." State v. Rodriguez, 
2007 UT 15, \V7,156 P.3d 771. For this same reason, an officer may likewise 
"run a background check of . . . passengers and, in addition,... order [both] 
driver and passengers out of the vehicle." Id. 
2
 This is true unless, of course, the reasonable suspicion that justified 
the stop is dispelled before the officer contacts the driver. See Morris, 2011 
UT 40, f 25 (holding that an officer who loses reasonable suspicion before 
contacting the driver may "offer an explanation," but "may not ask for 
identification, registration, or proof of insurance at this time unless during 
this brief encounter, new reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
immediately arises that justifies further detention"). 
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The Supreme Court has also held that to be reasonable in execution, a 
detention must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
justified the interference in the first place/' Teiry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 
(1968); accord Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (same); State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40,1 
15, 259 P.3d 116 (same); Baker, 2010 UT 18, |12 (same). Despite the Court's 
use of absolute language, this limitation in scope is not a bar to any and all 
officer activity unrelated to the initial purpose of the stop. As this Court 
recognized in Worwood, unrelated officer action is permissible so long as it 
does not (1) "'represent ' any further intrusion on the detainee's 
[constitutional] rights,'" or (2) "'add to the delay already lawfully 
experienced/" 2007 UT 47, ^[28,164 P.3d 397 (quoting State v. Chism, 2005 
UT App 41, fl5,107 P.3d 706)). 
When executing a stop, therefore, police cannot "change the level of 
coercion . . . to the degree that it is no longer justified under reasonable 
suspicion." Id. at [^30. For example, police conduct may not "become so 
intrusive that it escalates into a de facto arrest" without probable cause. Id. 
at f 30. Nor may officers conduct a search for evidence absent an additional 
showing of probable cause. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) 
("insisting] upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a 
reasonable search" for evidence in an automobile). In each of those 
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instances, the police conduct constitutes a " discrete Fourth Amendment 
event" requiring independent justification. See Mena, 544 U.S. at 100-01. 
In contrast, a mere "shift in purpose" alone does "not change the 
character of a [lawful] traffic stop" into "a constitutionally cognizable 
infringement." See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09. For example, an otherwise 
lawful detention does not become unlawful by mere police questioning on 
unrelated matters, see Mena, 544 U.S. at 100-01, nor, even, by deployment of 
"a well-trained narcotics detection dog" that "'discloses only the presence 
or absence of narcotics, a contraband item/ " Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (citing 
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). 
On the other hand, "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in 
issuing a warning [or] ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is 
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." 
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. The Supreme Court recently expounded on this 
principle in Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
In Johnson, gang task force officers stopped the driver of a vehicle for 
a registration violation. Id. at 327. While one officer spoke with the driver, 
another officer spoke with Johnson—a backseat passenger—hoping to gain 
intelligence about the gang Johnson might be in. Id. at 328. Johnson was 
wearing clothing consistent with gang membership and had a scanner in his 
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pocket, but officers "had no reason to suspect anyone in the vehicle of 
criminal activity." Id. at 327-28. In response to the officer's questions, 
Johnson said he did not have any identification, volunteered that he was 
from a town the officer knew was home to a Crips gang, and revealed that 
he had been in prison for burglary. Id. at 328. Based on these answers, 
Johnson's clothing, and his possession of the scanner, the officer suspected 
that he may be armed and frisked him. Id. 
The Supreme Court addressed two questions: (1) whether a frisk for 
weapons requires, as a prerequisite, reasonable suspicion that the suspect 
frisked is involved in criminal activity, id. at 330-32; and (2) whether 
questioning unrelated to the legitimate purpose of a stop renders the 
detention unlawful, id. at 332-34. The Court's answer to the second question 
is relevant to the question presented here.3 
The Arizona court of appeals concluded that the officer's authority to 
detain Johnson, and thus her authority to frisk him, ceased once she 
"undertook to question Johnson on a matter unrelated to the traffic stop, i.e., 
3
 In answering the first question, the Court held that assuming there is 
reasonable suspicion the passenger is armed and dangerous, an officer may 
frisk the passenger for weapons so long as "it is lawful for police to detain 
an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular 
violation." Johnson, 555 at 327. It held that "[t]he police need not have, in 
addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal 
activity." Id. 
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Johnson's gang affiliation." Id. at 332. The Supreme Court flatly rejected 
that conclusion. It held that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to 
the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into 
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not 
measurably extend the duration of the stop." Id. at 333 (citing Mena, 544 
U.S. at 100-01) (emphases added). Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that 
Deputy Luke's question to Petitioner was unrelated to the legitimate 
purpose of the stop, that fact did "not convert the encounter into something 
other than a lawful seizure." Id. 
The State acknowledges that Deputy Luke walked a few feet away 
from the driver and asked Petitioner whether he had anything the deputy 
needed to know about. But that action could only have extended the stop 
by mere seconds. Johnson held that unrelated questioning is permissible "so 
long as [it] do[es] not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Id. 
(emphasis added). In other words, unrelated questioning that only extends 
a stop incrementally, such as occurred here, will not render it unlawful. The 
question is not whether the officer's actions extended the stop by a few 
seconds or minutes, but whether it prolonged the stop "be)^ond the time 
reasonably required to complete" its purpose. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. It 
cannot be said on these facts that the question posed to Petitioner prolonged 
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the stop beyond the time reasonably required to investigate the driver's 
impairment or possession of paraphernalia. 
Petitioner argues that under Baker (as well as the pie-Johnson cases of 
Hansen and State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996)), any extension of 
time during a stop, no matter how slight, renders it unlawful. See Pet. Brf. 
at 8-26. But the Utah Supreme Court in Baker did not purport to overrule 
Johnson, which deals with officer conduct during a lawful detention. Baker 
instead addressed the propriety of extending a detention after the purpose 
of the stop is fulfilled. See Baker, 2010 UT 18, % 31 (holding that "any 
detention of an individual after the purpose of the initial detention has 
concluded violates the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis added). 
As conceded by Petitioner below, his continued detention was 
justified while Deputy Luke "continued to investigate [the driver's] 
sobriety," as well as the contraband possession, and thereafter "effectuated 
his arrest, or issued a citation." Aplt. Brf. at 13. The allegedly unrelated 
question posed to Petitioner during that time did not "measurably extend 
the duration of the stop," Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, or otherwise prolong it 
"beyond the time reasonably required [for Deputy Luke] to complete" his 
lawful investigation, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Respectfully submitted on June 14, 2012. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEW&Y S. GRAY 
sistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
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State of Utah, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) Case No. 20080109-CA 
v. ) F I L E D 
) (July 29, 2011) 
Milo Simons, ) 
) 1 2011 UTApp 251 1 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 061404283 
The Honorable James R. Taylor 
Attorneys: Douglas J. Thompson, Provo, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges McHugh, Roth, and Christiansen. 
McHUGH, Associate Presiding Judge: 
f l Milo Simons appeals from his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, a 
third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2010),1 arguing that a 
police officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by impermissibly extending the 
length of a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion. We affirm. 
because the relevant sections of the code have not changed, we cite to the 
current version as a convenience to the reader. 
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[^2 On the evening of October 21, 2006, Deputy John Luke was on patrol near 
Springville, Utah, with another officer whom he was training when he observed a 
vehicle traveling approximately ten miles per hour over the posted speed limit. After a 
computer check revealed that the vehicle was also uninsured, Deputy Luke initiated a 
traffic stop. The officer-in-training made initial contact with the vehicle's driver. 
During this initial encounter, Deputy Luke approached the vehicle from the passenger 
side to observe the exchange. Simons was sitting in the front passenger seat, but 
Deputy Luke did not speak with him at the time. The officers then met behind the 
vehicle. After a brief exchange between the officers, Deputy Luke approached the 
driver, as Deputy Luke would be the one actually issuing the citation if it were 
determined that a citation was appropriate. Deputy Luke requested the driver's license, 
registration, and proof of insurance. The driver explained that the vehicle was 
borrowed and that he was unable to provide proof of insurance. 
%3 Deputy Luke testified at the preliminary hearing that at this point, he observed 
signs of possible impairment in the driver, including watery, bloodshot eyes, and rapid 
speech and movement. Deputy Luke continued to observe "agitated" movements in 
the driver after he went back to his patrol car to conduct a records check. When he 
again approached the driver after conducting the records check, the driver "blurted out 
. . . without being questioned" that he was not drunk, told Deputy Luke to "look at [his] 
eyes," and "forced his face towards the window." Deputy Luke asked the driver to step 
out of the vehicle because he wanted to conduct field sobriety tests. As the driver 
stepped out of the vehicle, Deputy Luke observed, in the driver's side door 
compartment, "several baggies that had been chewed on." Deputy Luke testified that 
in his experience, he had only ever seen these types of baggies used to carry drugs and 
he noticed "white powder of a small crystal residue inside" the baggies, which he 
suspected was methamphetamine. 
^4 Deputy Luke testified that after he found the baggies, he "had the assisting 
officer just stand by with [the driver]" while he approached Simons, who was still 
sitting in the passenger seat. He explained to Simons that he had found paraphernalia 
in the car and asked Simons if there was "anything on his person [Deputy Luke] 
need[ed] to know about." Simons immediately confessed to having a pipe in his 
underwear. Deputy Luke then had Simons step out of the vehicle and shake the pipe 
out of his pants, where it fell to the ground. After the officers searched the driver and 
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placed him under arrest, Simons informed Deputy Luke that he also had 
methamphetamine in his pocket.2 
%5 Simons was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, see id. § 58-37a-5(l), and possession of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony, see id. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Simons was bound over for trial following a 
preliminary hearing. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the pipe 
and methamphetamine, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, see U.S. Const, amend. IV.3 The trial court denied Simons's motion, 
concluding that the used condition of the baggies "coupled with the possible 
impairment [of the driver] le[d] to a reasonable suspicion and concern about both 
occupants of the car." Following the trial court's denial of his motion, Simons entered a 
conditional guilty plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance,4 reserving 
his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, see State v. Sen/, 758 P.2d 935, 
939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
16 Simons appeals, arguing that the evidence in this case should be suppressed 
because Deputy Luke exceeded the permissible length and scope of the stop when, 
2Deputy Luke retrieved the bag from Simons's pocket and he testified that the 
bag's contents were subsequently tested and identified as methamphetamine. 
3Simons also cites article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in arguing that 
Deputy Luke's actions violated his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
However, because he has not argued for a separate analysis under the Utah 
Constitution, we consider only Simons's federal constitutional claim. See State v. Bean, 
869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[A]n appellate court can decline to address 
state constitutional claims under article I, section 14 if the party fails to proffer any 
explanation as to how this court's analysis should differ under this section from the 
federal counterpart/7 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Fourth Amendment to 
the LTnited States Constitution is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
4In exchange for pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance, the State 
agreed to dismiss the charge against Simons for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
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without reasonable suspicion that Simons was engaged in any criminal activity, he 
turned his attention from the driver to Simons and asked Simons if he had "anything on 
his person [Deputy Luke] need[ed] to know about." When reviewing a trial court's 
denial of a motion to suppress, we review the findings of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard, see State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 12,164 P.3d 397, and its legal conclusions 
for correctness, see State v. Baker, 2010 UT 1 8 , i 7 , 229 P.3d 650. '"When a case involves 
the reasonableness of a search and seizure, we afford little discretion to the district court 
because there must be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and 
prosecutorial officials/" Id. (quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,f12, 78 P.3d 590). 
Because we conclude that Deputy Luke did not exceed the permissible length of the 
stop, we need not determine whether Deputy Luke's questioning of Simons was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,113, 52 P.3d 1158 
("[A]n appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record." (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
%7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from 
"unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. "Although police must 
have a warrant to conduct most searches and seizures, 'officers may temporarily detain 
a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the 
purpose of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion.'" Baker, 2010 UT 18, % 11 
(quoting State v. James, 2000 UT 80, f10 ,13 P.3d 576). Although "'one does not lose the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile,'" id. (additional internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131 (Utah 1994)), the 
"'automobile exception' to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a 
lesser expectation of privacy 'due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly 
regulated status,'" id. (quoting James, 2000 UT 80, f 10). 
18 In order to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, we apply a two-step test. See id. % 12. "The first step is to determine 
whether the police officer's action [was] justified at its inception. In the second step, we 
must determine whether the detention following the stop was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place." Id. 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Simons concedes that 
Deputy Luke was justified in pulling the vehicle over for a speeding violation. See 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 ("[A] police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a 
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vehicle if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence/' 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We now address Simons's contention that Deputy 
Luke's conduct exceeded the scope of the traffic stop here. 
f 9 For the duration of a lawful traffic stop, "'[t]he temporary seizure of driver and 
passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the s top/" 
Baker, 2010 UT 18 , f13 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009)). Unless 
the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause of further 
criminal activity during the course of the traffic stop, "the officer must allow the seized 
person to depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded." Id.; see also State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 31, 63 P.3d 650 ("Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop 
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion of a further illegality." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). If, during the course of the traffic stop, police officers develop probable cause 
to arrest the driver, the passengers may lawfully be detained until the arrest is 
complete. See Baker, 2010 UT 18, \ \ 16,19. "At that time, officers must release any 
passengers who were detained incident to the detention of the vehicle." Id. \ 19. 
^10 During the course of an otherwise lawful encounter, however, officers may pose 
questions to drivers and passengers unrelated to the scope of the stop without 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, so long as those actions do not measurably 
extend the length of the stop. See Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at .788 ("An officer's inquiries into 
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter 
into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably 
extend the duration of the stop."). In making the determination of whether the stop has 
been measurably extended, "[a] court should not micromanage the details of a traffic 
stop to ensure that no actions of the police improperly extend the stop so long as the 
duration of the stop is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances." Baker, 2010 
UT 18, \ 17. Instead, "[t]he reasonableness of a detention should be evaluated on the 
basis of the totality of the circumstances facing the officer, not on judicial second-
guessing." Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 28. 
I l l Although Simons concedes that Deputy Luke was entitled to detain him while 
investigating his reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated and in possession 
of the residue-filled baggies, Simons contends that Deputy Luke impermissibly 
expanded the length of the stop when he ceased investigating the driver to approach 
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and question Simons. We disagree. While the record is unclear on the exact time it took 
for Deputy Luke to approach Simons, it indicates that Deputy Luke walked 
immediately from the driver's side to the passenger side and asked Simons if he had 
anything on his person that the officer should know about. In response to that single 
question, Simons immediately revealed that he had a pipe in his underwear. Under 
these circumstances, we are convinced that the question did not measurably extend the 
length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop unreasonable. See 
Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 787-88 (concluding that questions directed to a passenger during a 
traffic stop designed to assess possible gang membership were not part of a consensual 
encounter, but also acknowledging that "[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated 
to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something 
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the 
duration of the stop"); see also State v. Wilkinson, 2008 UT App 395,19,197 P.3d 96 
(concluding that an officer's request for a canine unit, in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion, did not impermissibly expand the scope or duration of a passenger's 
detention, because to conclude that any deviation from the purpose of the stop 
constitutes an illegal seizure "would place untenable demands on officers on the 
street"). Therefore, we affirm the denial of Simons's motion to suppress. 
112 Affirmed. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
113 WE CONCUR: 
Stephen L. Roth, Judge 
Michele M. Christiansen, Judge 
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ADDENDUMB 
Signed Minute Entry [Denying Motion to Suppress] 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Uiafo County^State of Utah 
rM^ f __Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah : 
Plaintiff : Minute Entry 
vs. : Date: 
Kevin Sorensen, : Case Number: 061404282 
Milo B.Simons 061404283-
Defendants : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion of each of the Defendants to 
suppress evidence seized at the time of their arrest. For the reasons explained below the motions 
are denied. 
The State and both Defendants indicated to the Court that they wished to submit the 
motions upon the facts as elicited during the preliminary hearing. This Court conducted the 
hearing and has a transcript of the testimony. 
On October 21st, 2006 at an undetermined time of day Deputy Sheriff John Rockwell 
Luke was patrolling on SR 77 in Utah County with trainee officer Dan Thomas. They observed a 
vehicle traveling at a steady 10 miles per hour above the posted speed limit. The license plate 
wras reported to dispatch who informed the deputies that records available to them indicated the 
vehicle to be uninsured. The officers made a traffic stop. Deputy Luke first went to the 
passenger side of the vehicle where he observed Defendant Simons in the front passenger seat. 
Paqe 1 of 5 
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The trainee deputy went to the driver's door. After a brief exchange the deputies met behind the 
vehicle and then Deputy Luke approached the driver, Defendant Sorensen. The reason for this 
procedure was that the trainee, Deputy Thomas, was being given experience in the stop and 
approach but it was determined that if a citation were to be given Deputy Luke would be the 
citing officer. Deputy Luke confirmed that Mr. Sorensen could not provide proof of insurance 
for the vehicle. 
During this exchange Deputy Luke observed what he considered to be signs of 
impairment. These signs included watery, bloodshot eyes; rapid speech and movement and 
agitated, rapid body movement. The deputy felt that the unusual body language indicated 
possible intoxication or impairment. He stepped back to check records on the suspects and then 
re-approached the driver's side of the car. Mr. Sorensen, not in response to any question or 
comment, blurted out that he was not drunk and, forcing his face toward the window, asked the 
officer to look in his eyes. 
From these observations the deputy concluded that he had a suspicion Mr. Sorensen was 
driving while impaired. In order to continue investigation of that suspicion he directed Mr. 
Sorensen to get out of the vehicle. When the door was opened he observed in plain view in the 
door compartment two used corners or fragments of baggies which were consistent with the 
storage and use of controlled substances. In an effort to investigate a suspicion that the 
occupants of the car may have recently used drugs the training deputy was directed to stay with 
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Mr. Sorensen while Deputy Luke questioned Mr. Simons, who was still m the vehicle. He told 
Mr. Simons he had found paraphernalia in the car and asked if he had anything on his person that 
he needed to know about. Mr. Simons immediately told him that he had a pipe in his underwear. 
Mr. Simons then stepped out of the vehicle at the deputy's direction. A pipe fell to the ground 
out of his right pant leg. Both Defendants were then searched and methamphetamine was located 
a small sack or satchel in Mr. Sorensen's left coat pocket and, also, in a small pants pocket of 
Mr. Simons. 
It is well established in Utah that an officer may stop a vehicle for an offense committed 
in his presence. Indeed, in this case neither defendant challenges the propriety of the initial 
traffic stop. A traffic stop is a level two encounter, which may be based upon reasonable 
suspicion. Officers may conduct a reasonable investigation suggested by such a suspicion. 
In this case Deputy Luke's initial suspicion of driving while impaired was quickly 
supplemented by his observation of drug paraphernalia in plain sight when the car door was 
properly opened to remove Mr. Sorensen to investigate the possible DUI charge. The baggies 
were not only strongly likely to be paraphernalia, the used condition implied use of the drugs 
they might have contained. That suspicion coupled with the signs of possible impairment lead to 
a reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car. The tactics including 
a quick search of Mr. Sorensen's person and questioning Mr. Simons about drug possession or 
use, followed by a search of his person (perhaps a bit of an overstatement since the search 
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consisted of having him step and literally shake a leg so the paraphernalia slipped down his pant 
leg to be recovered by the officer) wrere reasonably suggested by his concerns. Once it was 
confirmed that Mr. Simons was in possession of drug paraphernalia, arrest and a further, 
concurrent search of his person was justified. Consent of either Defendant to the search was 
irrelevant and this Court makes no finding on that point. 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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